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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.H., a juvenile male, appeals from the district court's 
order transferring him from juvenile to adult status for 
criminal prosecution pursuant to Section 5302 of the 
Juvenile Delinquency Act ("JDA"), 18 U.S.C. § 5032. I.H. 
contends that the district court did not have jurisdiction 
over the transfer procedure, and that the district court's 
factual findings were insufficient to support its decision to 
transfer him. We agree that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to begin the transfer procedure.1 Therefore, it is 
not necessary to reach the sufficiency of the court's factual 
findings. 
 
I. 
 
I.H. was born on November 6, 1978. On October 18, 
1995, when I.H. was 16 years old, he, and two adults, 
Duncan Connor, Jr., and David Thompson, kidnaped at 
gunpoint Leslie and David Kalov by forcibly taking control 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Even though we hold that the district court never acquired jurisdiction 
over I.H., we nevertheless have jurisdiction over the appeal from the 
district court's transfer order. See United States v. Doe, 13 F.3d 302 (9th 
Cir. 1993) ("We conclude that although this court has jurisdiction over 
the appeal, the district court lacked jurisdiction to commence juvenile 
delinquency proceedings against the minor"). 
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of their car and driving them to Little Magens Bay, St. 
Thomas, United States Virgin Islands. I.H. was armed with 
a handgun, and sat in the back seat of the car with the gun 
trained on the Kalovs who were seated next to him. I.H. 
fired one shot during the incident but neither of the Kalovs 
was hit, although the car's windshield was shattered. After 
arriving at Little Magens Bay, I.H. and the two adult 
perpetrators robbed the Kalovs, then raped and sodomized 
Leslie Kalov. 
 
About four weeks later, on November 15, 1995, I.H., who 
had just turned seventeen years old, committed an armed 
robbery of the Emerald Lady jewelry store on St. Thomas, 
United States Virgin Islands with an accomplice. I.H. was 
subsequently identified as the leader of the duo who first 
entered the store and brandished a gun in the face of the 
store's employees. The accomplice was still at large when 
this appeal was taken. 
 
On March 18, 1996, I.H. was arrested and charged by 
information with carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, 
and with the local offense of aggravated rape in violation of 
14 V.I.C. § 1700(c).2 Three days later, on March 21, 1996, 
I.H., was arrested for the November 15, 1995, armed 
robbery of the jewelry store and charged with a Hobbs Act 
violation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and possession of 
a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). He was also charged with 
local offenses, including armed robbery and first degree 
assault in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 1862(2) and 295, 
respectively. 
 
On March 29, 1996, the United States Attorney filed a 
petition pursuant to Section 5302 of the JDA to transfer 
the carjacking and aggravated rape charges to the federal 
district court in order to prosecute I.H. as an adult. On 
April 3, 1996, a similar § 5302 petition was filed in the 
Hobbs Act and armed robbery case. The district court held 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Subsequently, on August 8, 1996, the United States Attorney 
superseded the information to include additional local offenses 
committed during the carjacking and aggravated rape, viz., kidnaping to 
commit rape in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 1052, armed robbery in violation 
of 14 V.I.C. § 1862 and first degree assault in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 295. 
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hearings on both petitions on April 4 and 11, 1996, and on 
August 30, 1996, the government's petitions to transfer 
both cases for adult prosection were granted. This appeal 
followed.3 
 
II. 
 
Section 5032 of the JDA establishes the procedural 
requirements for transferring a juvenile4 from state 
authorities to a federal district court for criminal 
prosecution as an adult. The procedure has two parts. The 
first part is the certification procedure, which has two 
separate certification requirements. First, there is the "need 
certification" provision under which the Attorney General 
certifies "there is a need for proceedings to take place in 
federal rather than state court." United States v. Doe, 19 
F.3d 302, 303 (9th Cir. 1993). Under this provision, the 
Attorney General5 must certify to the district court that: 
 
(1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a 
State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume 
jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such 
alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does 
not have available programs or services adequate for 
the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a 
crime of violence that is a felony or an offense 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The order from which I.H., appeals is not "final" for the purposes of 28 
U.S.C. § 1291; nonetheless, we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
the collateral order doctrine. See In re A.M., 34 F.3d 153, 155-56 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
4. Under the Juvenile Act, a " `juvenile' is a person who has not attained 
his eighteenth birthday, or for the purpose of proceedings and 
disposition under this chapter for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency, 
a person who has not attained his twenty-first birthday. . . ." 18 U.S.C. 
§ 5301. Juvenile delinquency "is the violation of a law of the United 
States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday. . . ." Id. 
 
5. Under regulations adopted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032, the Attorney 
General delegated her authority to the Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of the Criminal Division and his Deputy Assistant Attorneys 
General. 28 C.F.R. § 0.57. The Assistant Attorney General is authorized 
to redelegate authority to United States Attorneys. United States v. Doe, 
98 F.3d 459, 460-61 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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[enumerated in this paragraph], and that there is a 
substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense 
to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 5032 ¶ 1. Second, there is the "record 
certification" provision, which states: 
 
Any proceedings against a juvenile shall not be 
commenced until any prior juvenile court records of 
such juvenile have been received by the court, or the 
clerk of the juvenile court has certified in writing that 
the juvenile has no prior record, or that the juvenile's 
record is unavailable and why it is unavailable. 
 
Id. at ¶ 10. 
 
Once the certification requirements are met, the second 
part of the transfer procedure can begin. The United States 
Attorney can move in the federal district court to transfer 
the juvenile to be tried as an adult. Section 5302 provides 
two methods for transfer -- permissive and mandatory. A 
permissive transfer can be made if the district court "finds, 
after hearing, [that] such transfer would be in the best 
interest of justice." Id. at ¶ 4. To determine whether a 
transfer "would be in the best interest of justice," the 
district court is directed to consider evidence of the 
following factors: 
 
the age and social background of the juvenile; the 
nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of 
the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's 
present intellectual development and psychological 
maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the 
juvenile's response to such efforts; the availability of 
programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral 
problems. 
 
Id. at ¶ 5. In considering the nature of the offense, the 
district court is required to "consider the extent to which 
the juvenile played a leadership role in an organization, or 
otherwise influenced other persons to take part in criminal 
activities, involving the use or distribution of controlled 
substances or firearms." Id. 
 
A mandatory transfer shall be made if 
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[A] juvenile who is alleged to have committed an act 
after his sixteenth birthday which if committed by an 
adult would be a felony offense that has an element 
thereof the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person or another, or that, 
by its very nature, involves a substantial risk that 
physical force against the person of another may be 
used in committing the offense, or would be [an offense 
specifically enumerated], and who has previously been 
found guilty of an act which if committed by an adult 
would have been one of the offenses set forth in this 
paragraph or an offense in violation of a State felony 
statute that would have been such an offense if a 
circumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction has 
existed. . . . 
 
Id. at ¶ 4. 
 
Here, the government recites that it filed the "requisite 
certification" in accordance with Section 5302 of the JDA in 
each of the juvenile's cases that it sought to transfer to 
district court for adult criminal prosecution. See Appellee's 
Br. at 3-4. However, the government admits that it failed to 
comply with the record certification requirement of Section 
5302. Id. at 9. We assume that by reciting that it filed the 
"requisite certification," the government means that it filed 
the need certification. I.H. does not allege that the 
government did not file the need certification. Nonetheless, 
the government argues that its "technical failure[to comply 
with the record certification] should not create a fatal blow 
to the District Court's exercise of jurisdiction" because the 
district court was verbally, and informally, informed that 
I.H. did not have a prior juvenile record. Id. 
 
On March 19, 1996, at a detention hearing following 
I.H.'s arrest on the carjacking and aggravated rape charges, 
the United States Magistrate Judge entered an order 
directing the Family Division of the Territorial Court of the 
Virgin Islands to supply the United States Probation Office 
with "any and all juvenile adjudication information, 
criminal indictment and court contacts" concerning I.H. 
Supp. Ap. at 1A. The Territorial Court did not comply with 
that order. The government's appendix on appeal contains 
a copy of a letter from the Clerk of the Territorial Court to 
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the United States Probation Office, with a carbon copy to 
the magistrate judge, which recites that a search of the 
court's "criminal and juvenile records revealed that . . . 
[I.H., has] no record with this court." Supp. Ap. at 1. 
However, that letter contains neither a certification by the 
clerk of the court nor an imprint of an official seal. Further, 
the letter is dated November 25, 1996, almost three months 
after the district court's order transferring I.H. to federal 
district court for prosecution as an adult. However, 
according to the government, the United States Probation 
Service contacted the Family Division of the Territorial 
Court and was informed that I.H., had no prior juvenile 
record. The government asserts that it verbally 
communicated that information to the district court prior to 
the district court's decision on its transfer motions. In 
addition, the government claims that the Virgin Islands 
Department of Human Services confirmed in writing to the 
district court that the Department had no prior contact 
with I.H. 
 
Thus, the government is arguing both that it made a 
good faith effort to comply, and did substantially comply, 
with the record certification requirement. Accordingly, it 
asks us to overlook that it did not comply with the letter of 
the statute. 
 
I.H. argues that strict compliance with the record 
certification provision of § 5032 is a jurisdictional 
prerequisite without which the district court cannot 
transfer him for criminal prosecution as an adult. He 
contends that the government's failure to furnish the record 
certification deprives the district court of jurisdiction. 
 
Our inquiry begins, as it must, with the language of the 
statute. Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)("We begin with the 
familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting 
point for interpreting a statute is the language of the 
statute itself."). Section 5032's record certification 
requirement reads: 
 
 A juvenile shall not be transferred to adult 
prosecution nor shall a hearing be held under section 
5037 (disposition after a finding of juvenile 
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delinquency) until any prior juvenile court records of 
such juvenile have been received by the court, or the 
clerk of the juvenile court has certified in writing that 
the juvenile has no prior record, or that the juvenile's 
record is unavailable and why it is unavailable. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 5032 ¶ 10 (emphasis added). The language of 
the statute could not be clearer. It plainly states that a 
juvenile "shall not be transferred" for prosecution as an 
adult "until" the juvenile's prior court records are delivered 
to the district court or until the clerk of the juvenile court 
has certified in writing that the juvenile has no such 
record. 
 
The courts of appeals that have considered this issue are 
in near unanimous agreement that the record certification 
requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite in a transfer 
proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 
1369-70 (2nd Cir. 1994); United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 
169, 170 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Juvenile Male, 
923 F.2d 614, 620 (8th Cir. 1991); and United States v. 
Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 222-23 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 
The record certification requirement is not met if the 
government makes absolutely no effort to comply with the 
record certification requirement, United States v. Juvenile 
Male, 923 F.2d at 620, or if the government knows of the 
existence of juvenile records but makes no effort to provide 
them to the district court. United States v. Brian N., 900 
F.2d at 223. In such cases, the district court has no 
jurisdiction to begin the transfer procedure. The 
government relies upon United States v. Parker, supra, to 
argue that a good faith effort, or substantial compliance, is 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. There, the court held that 
a letter from a state court judge and letters from three 
assistant district attorneys, all of which stated that no 
charges had been filed against the juvenile in their 
respective counties, satisfied the record certification 
requirement of § 5032. The court said: "[W]e decline to 
stand on technicalities." 956 F.2d at 170. However, the 
court's analysis is not so compelling as to persuade us that 
we can ignore the clear language of the statute by labeling 
it a "legal technicality". Moreover, United States v. Juvenile 
Male and United States v. Parker concern the government's 
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efforts to transfer the same juvenile, "P.P.," to adult 
prosecution in a contract murder conspiracy. In Juvenile 
Male, the court had found lack of jurisdiction because the 
government made no effort to comply with the record 
certification provision. Accordingly, the court's later 
decision in Parker not "to stand on technicalities" may well 
have been driven more by frustration at the government's 
inability or unwillingness to comply with the record 
certification provision than by a reasoned analysis of the 
statute. Interestingly, in the earlier case where the 
government failed to comply with the certification 
requirements to transfer P.P. to be tried as an adult, the 
court ruled there was no jurisdiction over the juvenile 
stating, "we reaffirm that a certification in compliance with 
section 5032 is necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction 
under that section." United States v. Juvenile Male, 923 
F.2d at 618. The court then went on to state "[i]n summary, 
section 5032 has specific jurisdictional requirements and 
compliance with their requirements is necessary for federal 
court jurisdiction to exist. . . . the government failed to 
comply with the statute and, thus, failed to invoke federal 
jurisdiction." Id. At 620. In any event, we will not effect a 
judicial amendment of the statute by reading in language 
that would allow for the exception that the government 
urges. 
 
Despite the decision in United States v. Parker, we 
conclude that the language of the statute requires strict 
and literal compliance with the record certification 
requirement. Absent some evidence of contrary 
congressional intent, we must assume that the statute 
means what it says. A juvenile "shall not be transferred to 
adult prosecution . . . until" the district court receives any 
prior juvenile court records or the clerk of the juvenile court 
certifies that there are no such records. This statute is not 
so ambiguous as to require us to resort to legislative history 
to decide its meaning. Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount 
Co., 898 F.2d 907, 910 (3d Cir. 1990)("[S]tatutory 
construction should halt at such time as the court 
determines the text at issue to be plain and unambiguous"), 
citing Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981). 
Nevertheless, we note that the legislative history is 
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consistent with our analysis, and is another reason why we 
remain unpersuaded by U.S. v. Parker. 
 
The record certification requirement was added to § 5032 
in 1984, as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1201(c), 98 Stat. 1837, 
2150 (1984). In describing the provision, the Senate Report 
commented: 
 
Too often, however, juvenile proceedings are 
undertaken without the benefit of such information. 
This new paragraph stresses that these records be 
obtained beforehand whenever possible. The 
Committee intends, however, that this new provision's 
requirements are to be understood in the context of a 
standard of reasonableness. Thus, if reasonable efforts 
to obtain a juvenile's records have been made, a 
certification of their unavailability is permissible. Also, 
the Committee intends that this new requirement be 
applied with a degree of flexibility so that stages of 
proceedings to which such records are not relevant are 
not delayed pending arrival of the records. Thus, it is 
appropriate that a hearing concerning a transfer for 
prosecution await the arrival of a juvenile's court 
records, since they are highly relevant to the transfer 
decision. 
 
S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 391 (1984), reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3531 (emphasis added). 
Although it could be argued that the Report's concern for 
"reasonableness" and "flexibility" support the government's 
position here, and the holding in Parker, the context of that 
language requires a contrary interpretation. The Report 
simply states that the actual records need not be produced 
following "reasonable" efforts to find them so long as "a 
certification" of their unavailability is tendered. Similarly, 
the concern for "flexibility" is addressed, not by relaxing the 
jurisdictional prerequisite, but by insuring that the records 
are not required until the appropriate stage of the 
proceedings. 
 
Accordingly, neither the clear language of the statute, nor 
its legislative history, allows for substantial, good faith, but 
inadequate compliance with the required record 
 
                                10 
certification. Here, the jurisdictional prerequisites of § 5023 
were not met and the district court was therefore without 
jurisdiction to transfer I.H. to district court for criminal 
prosecution as an adult. Accordingly, the district court's 
August 30, 1996, order transferring I.H. for adult criminal 
prosecution is without force and effect. 
 
Although the district court's transfer order has no effect, 
I.H. does not automatically escape adult prosecution in 
federal court. The United States Attorney is still free to 
proceed under § 5032 because I.H. has not yet "attained his 
twenty-first birthday." See 18 U.S.C.§ 5031 and United 
States v. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d at 620. 
 
III. 
 
For the above reasons, we will vacate the August 30, 
1996, order transferring I.H., to the district court for 
criminal prosecution as an adult and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
Proceedings under the JDA begin with the filing of an 
information. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 ¶ 3. However, § 5032 does 
not state when the record certification must be provided to 
the district court. The Tenth Circuit has held that the 
record certification must be filed when the information is 
filed. United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d at 223 ("We believe 
that the statute mandates the filing of such records at the 
commencement of the proceedings -- the filing of the 
information."). However, the Second Circuit, while stressing 
that the government "should always endeavor to supply the 
district court with official juvenile records prior to the filing 
of an information," has found that the government's 
furnishing of a certified copy of the juvenile's prior record 
after the transfer motion was filed but immediately prior to 
the district court's decision to order the transfer was timely. 
United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d at 1370. 
 
The issue here, however, is not the precise timing of the 
filing of the record certification, but whether the 
government filed the record certification as required for 
jurisdiction over a juvenile. Because we have found that the 
requirement was not met in this case, we offer no opinion 
on the question of what stage prior to the court obtaining 
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jurisdiction over a juvenile the record certification must be 
filed. 
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